Dear Fabienne,

Thank you for your kind words with your address query about the Foresight Network.

Apologies for my delay in sending this copy of my 1982 report on Stockholm - I have had another busy week up in the hoist + various electrical + building work to supervise.

No, I am not a current member of the Foresight Network, but I will look into it a bit if I might usefully join up.

Very best with it,

David

P.S. There are also 2 pages of WFSF reports from 1982 which were with my report in my file, in case there's any interest to you.
The Future of Politics

A personal review and comment on the 7th World Futures Research conference in Stockholm, arranged by the World Futures Studies Federation, June 6-8th 1982.

by David J. Barry

On the east side of Stockholm, the Foresta Conference Centre on the island of Lidingö offered a stimulating environment for the seventh World Futures Research Conference of the W.F.S.F. Right next to the Centre the sculpture museum of Carl Milles, one of Sweden’s foremost sculptors, provided some pertinent surrealist images for our time. An evening outing by river steamer for dinner at Waxholm, in the archipelago, and a bus trip to the Stockholm City Hall for lunch were the two main social breaks during the conference. For those few who were prepared to stay for the day after the conference finished, the Swedish Secretariat for Future Studies arranged a most informative visit to their offices which currently house all the archive and administration of the World Futures Studies Federation, at the home of Tibor Hattovy, the Coordinator of the local World Futures Society chapter.

Among the two hundred participants at the conference were Ali Mazrui, Rudolf Bahro, Mihailo Marković, Henryk Skocimowski, Eleonora Masini, Aurelia Pecci, Mehdi Elmandjra, Lars Ingelstam and W. Americans including James Dator, Richard Falk, Magda McHale and Glenn Paige. The conference could hardly avoid being an experience—or rather two hundred experiences of varying interest and pleasure.

W.F.S. readers who have not heard of the World Futures Studies Federation are forgiven. It is a comparatively small organisation, with a membership of around four hundred, compared with the Futurist’s readership of some thirty thousand. It is a low profile organisation, and W.F.S. publications do not usually go out of their way to change that. — It merits a single
line, for instance, in Edward Cornish's 'The Study of the Future', one of
the best single-volume introductions to futures studies. There was also
an entry, slightly mis-titled, as the 'World Future Studies Federation',
in the first edition of the W.F.S. guide to information on futures personnel
and organisations. In the same vein, readers of Futures journal might
have been amused recently to see an editorial apology for mis-naming the
W.F.S.F. as the 'World Future Society Federation' in its April '82 coverage
of the W.F.S.F. regional seminar in The Hague. — "Not an anticipation but
a mistake" was the frank admission!

Many futurists, including some who belong to both organisations, might
support my own experience that such slips over the name of the W.F.S.F.
are not infrequent, and probably reveal confusion, unease or dissatisfaction
with the role of the W.F.S.F. Is it perhaps that it has similar objectives
but seems, in practice, to be so different from the World Future Society?
Or is it that it should be different, but actually works out in much the
same way as the W.F.S.?

Let us compare, for a start, the main aims of the two organisations, and
bear these in mind as we try to assess the tone and direction of a selection
of conference papers.

The World Future Society

1. To contribute to a reasoned awareness of the future and of the importance
   of its study.

2. To advance responsible and serious investigation of the future.

3. To promote the development and improvement of methodologies for the
   study of the future.

4. To increase public understanding of future-oriented activities and studies.

5. To facilitate communication and cooperation among organisations and
   individuals interested in studying or planning for the future.
The World Futures Studies Federation

1. Serving as a forum for exchange of information and opinions, thus stimulating cooperative research activities in all fields of futures studies.

2. Planning and carrying out regional and international Futures Studies Conferences.

3. Promoting a higher level of future consciousness in general.

4. Stimulating the democratization of future-oriented thinking.

5. Stimulating an awareness of the urgent need for futures studies in governments, international organisations as well as decisionmaking and educational groups and institutions, to resolve problems at local, national, regional and global levels.

6. Assisting national and international future research activities.

Though remarkably similar in their focus, the W.F.S.F. does seem to put more emphasis on international conferences, while the W.F.S. puts more emphasis on methodologies. Another difference is the emphasis on 'the future' by the W.F.S. whereas the W.F.S.F. emphasises 'futures'.

One of the few references in W.F.S. publications to the World Conferences on Futures Research organised by the W.F.S.F. occurred in Michael Marien's Bulletin review of the 'Great Canadian Futures Conference of '77', where he extolled the virtues of the Kingston conference as a model for such national conferences and then made some brief but trenchant comments about the values and weaknesses of international conferences:

"There may still be a need for general international conferences, such as the two International Futures Research Conferences, held in Oslo(1967) and Kyoto(1970), and the 1973 Rome World Special Conference on Futures Research. But ....even in the best of economic times, such conferences only attract a well-heeled élite and hold little of particular interest for the host country."

Such observations, coming as they do from one of the most astute analysts of futures studies and research, should be taken seriously, and answered, as far as possible, in relation to the 1982 Stockholm conference of the W.F.S.F.

While referring to N. America, it is perhaps worth noting that the W.F.S.F. type of format for conference pre-planning was adopted by the Biennial Woodlands Conferences in Texas, sponsored by the Mitchell Energy & Development Corporation. Like the W.F.S.F., they hold 'pre-conference workshops' in different countries to obtain a 'better global perspective' on the United
on the United States' possibilities of transition to a state of sustainable growth. Where they differ is in their focus on the U.S. while the prime focus of the W.F.S.F. is the United Nations, resulting sometimes in open criticism of U.S. foreign policy or business practices, when global objectives and the interests of non-aligned and developing countries are threatened.

It may be that a similar division of interests prevents the W.F.S. and the W.F.S.F. from cooperating more than they do. An example that makes me wonder whether there is a lack of cooperation can be found in a W.F.S. Bulletin article written by one of those involved in planning the Stockholm conference, on a subject central to the conference. Yet there was no mention of his involvement with the W.F.S.F. or of the planned conference closely related to the article. On the other hand, the W.F.S.F. does lend to report and advertise the main W.F.S. conferences and journals.

If there is a lack of cooperation between the two organisations it is, I believe, regrettable. Each has its strengths, and each can benefit from the experience of the other. Though the W.F.S. has a much stronger line of journals and publications, the W.F.S.F. has produced, over the years, some good, internationally oriented, futures studies conference publications and does offer, in my opinion, a more balanced global perspective than the W.F.S.

Though I have been a member of both the W.F.S. and W.F.S.F. for many years, it is only after attending a W.F.S.F. conference, for the first time, that I feel I've begun to understand the relationship between the two. Hopefully, others may also sense, through this review, some areas of debate which may encourage further research on the direction and development of futures studies.

Background to the World Futures Studies Federation

It might help at this stage to sketch in some of the background history of the World Futures Studies Federation.

After a series of World Futures Research Conferences, in Oslo (1: 1967), in Kyoto (2:1970) and in Bucharest (3:1972), the first general meeting of the W.F.S.F. was held as part of the Special World Conference on Futures Research in Rome at Frascati (4: 1973), organised by the Italian Futures Research Institute, I.R.A.D.E.S. Subsequent meetings were held during the research conferences at Dubrovnik (5:1976) and Cairo (6:1978). The seventh World Futures Research Conference was originally scheduled to be held in
New Delhi in November 1980, but was cancelled, I understand, due to unacceptable manipulative pressures by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi.

Funding Third World representation

A distinguishing feature of W.F.S.F. conferences is the importance attached to raising funds to enable a higher proportion of speakers and contributors to come from less developed countries than would otherwise have been possible. In the case of the Stockholm conference, I understand that the Swedish Aid Agency provided around $20,000 for this specific purpose. I'm sure the W.F.S.F. would have welcomed more than this, had it been available, but it was enough to provide reasonable Third World representation, as discussed in detail later on.

The result of this policy can be seen in the comparative dominance of attitudes and assumptions based on Third World and Russian satellite countries' experience. In shorthand terms, this often means the rejection of both Western capitalism and Russian communism as economic and social systems, accompanied by attempts to develop and test suitable, pluralistic alternatives which might avoid the excesses of both systems. Not that such views are absent from World Future Society conferences, but that they are very small as a proportion, in my experience. The inclusion of the Chinese group at Toronto, in 1980, was a particularly significant sign that the World Future Society was attempting to include world perspectives other than the North American.

Though 'futurists' see themselves as being more open-minded than most, I suspect that many would find some of the assumptions and assertions at W.F.S.F. conferences difficult to handle at first. For instance, the notion of the West being 'overdeveloped'; the critical use of 'ideology' to examine and question the assumptions of power élites of every kind, including 'futurists'; critical assessment of the free enterprise policies of the West in terms of their domination and control, directly and indirectly, of the less developed countries (L.D.C.s); the resulting scientific and technological disenfranchisement of L.D.C.s; the acceleration of female domination by men in later stages of international capitalism; the desirability of genuine pluralism and authenticity of cultures both between nations and within national borders. Such notions, however, are the very stuff of which W.F.S.F. conferences are made, though not necessarily
deployed in the most coherent or comprehensible forms.
It is, perhaps, relevant to remember that the population of N. America
is about five percent of the global population of 4.3 billions, yet the
balance of power in terms of armaments, educational resources, and incomes
is largely the reverse of this. The membership of the W.F.S. and the W.F.S.F.
reflects this reverse relationship, the latter having just over one per cent
of the membership of the former.

**W.F.S.F. Secretariat, Presidents and Honorary Members**

Unlike most organisations, including U.N. bodies, the W.F.S.F. is
establishing a tradition of changing the location of its Secretariat every
few years, to prevent, one assumes, any national or individual viewpoint
from becoming too dominant. From 1974–1981, during its most formative
period, the W.F.S.F. Secretariat was led by Eleonora Masini in Rome. Since
1981 it has been housed in the very suitable offices of the Swedish
Secretariat for Future Studies, with Göran Bäckstrand (pron. Beckstrand) as
Secretary-General. 7

Similarly the W.F.S.F. Council meetings have been held in several different
countries.—No doubt spreading the costs and responsibilities across several
countries is another factor in this policy of mobility.

The W.F.S.F. was, and still is, formally registered at L'Association
International Futuribles, in Paris. The Secretariat was based there from
1973–4, and Bertrand de Jouvenel became its first elected President.
(W.F.S. members may remember that Edward Cornish, on behalf of the World
Future Society, honoured him, at the opening of the Toronto Assembly in 1980,
with a 'distinguished service award' for his contributions to futurology.)
Succeeding Presidents of the W.F.S.F. have been Johan Galtung, Norway (1975–7),
Mahdi Elmandjra, Morocco (1977–81) and, currently, Eleonora Masini of Italy.
Robert Jungk founded *Mankind 2000* in 1966, and played a key role, alongside
the Peace Research Institute, in setting up the first research conference in
Oslo as well as helping in subsequent conferences. The W.F.S.F. recognises
Robert Jungk and Bertrand de Jouvenel as their only two 'Honorary Members'
to date, in appreciation of their services.

**W.F.S.F. Sponsorship**

Sponsors who have helped fund W.F.S.F. conferences, planning meetings and
Council meetings include Unesco, the U.N. University, the U.N. Environment
well as Futuribles, *Mankind 2000*, the Club of Rome, the Netherlands Council
for Government Policy and the Gottlieb Duttweiler Institute in Switzerland. The last two provided the facilities for two conferences on 'the future of political institutions and government' which prepared the way for the Stockholm conference on 'The Future of Politics'. Reports on these two meetings by Bart van Steenbergen and Jim Dator appeared in W.F.S.F. Newsletters as part of the background to the main conference.

Another aspect of W.F.S.F. commitment lies in the twice yearly postgraduate courses in futures studies, usually held for four weeks at the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, based on research plans of W.F.S.F. members.

'The Future of Politics', Stockholm, 1982

When trying to assess whether or not to attend a conference with an unfamiliar organisation, most of us try to sense clues from accompanying publications and comments of those who've attended previous conferences. One of my own expectations, after reading Eleonora Masini's 'Guidelines' for the 'Special' conference in Rome, in 1973, was that there might be a tradition of emphasising discussion and debate. For, in describing the purpose of that conference, she wrote that the 'operational purpose' was "to single out those results of research that can be implemented. For too long we have concentrated our efforts on research, analyses and discussions without acting." To that end "our operational purpose urged us to lose no time in searching for solutions to the problem under discussion. Therefore the papers will not be read at the Conference; instead we shall proceed immediately to debate the solutions they propose rather than their analytic aspects." (ibid. p.106, my emphasis) "If it fails to produce indications for solutions to some, at least, of the urgent problems facing the world today, then it will have failed its purpose." (ibid. p.107)

This format seemed to me eminently democratic and potentially more creative than the conventional one of 'experts' expounding to a silent and often mystified audience. However, this expectation was only partially fulfilled at Stockholm, where plenary lectures shared equal time with working seminar groups, - about eight hours each. - In the three days, there were nine lectures, and , if illness and flight problems had not prevented the attendance of Torsten Hågerstrand and Jimoh Omo-Fadaka, there might have been eleven. Even with their time available for questions, there seemed all too little time for genuine debate in the plenary sessions.

This is not to say that the talks were not worthwhile, but that several participants, particularly those, like myself, involved in communications, felt that there are better ways of communicating and learning, in the sense
of two-way involvement and dialogue. The read paper... does seem curiously inefficient and anachronistic as a communication form, particularly when, as at Stockholm, not a single visual or audio-visual illustration complemented or enhanced the ten plenary lectures. As it happens, the previous conference in Cairo was centrally concerned with 'the future of communication and cultural identity',... and was concerned with 'media literacy' in several forms. John McHale, more/most others at that conference, understood the importance of using aesthetically moving forms of communication together with more linear, academic forms to provide a participative and mature understanding of global problems and possibilities. It does seem to me particularly important that the style of the W.F.S.F. conference should exemplify, at least partially, some of the emerging communication styles and values of a sustainable global democracy, selectively using appropriate forms of information technology.

The Swedish Secretariat for the Stockholm conference was commendably efficient in providing copies of almost all the plenary lectures, for release after each talk, and provided delegates with sets of papers for two of the eight working groups on arrival.

Publication of conference papers

Titles of the seventy papers available appear in Table I, set out in their subject groups, I - VIII, with the Plenary group first, (P to indicate Plenary talk hereafter.) Quotations from these papers will cite the group number and number of the speaker, followed by the page reference on the conference copies.

As indicated on the Table, about twenty papers are being published during 1983 under the editorship of Bill Page... and are asterisked both in the Table and against any references in the text. 10

In addition some of the papers in sections I and VIII are being published in a special issue of Policy Sciences, and Nicole Ball's paper (Group IV) in the Unesco Social Science Journal. 11

My favourite papers were Richard L.Stevens' on 'Extra-Parliamentary Movements' - a one-page synopsis, and Mats Fräberg's lists of 'Social Movements' and their qualities. If only more papers were summarised in this form, more good ideas would perhaps gain insight and generate the energy they merit.

Third World perspectives

Rather than begin with statistics about Third World representation at Stockholm, it is probably more meaningful to look at some of the perspectives and views presented, and try to assess how far they epitomise Michael Marien's description of the 'well-heeled élite'.
To begin with it can hardly be denied that all the 'Third World' participants do represent a very special élite in their own countries. This is partly because the conference language, English, is only learnt (e.g. to newspaper reading level) by about 5% in a country like India. Again, those who acquire the knowledge and skills to contribute to such a conference must be a minute proportion of that English speaking population.

What is more important, however, is whether the Third World delegates present a standard western-dominated perspective, acquired through education and socialisation in the West, or in Western educated families, or whether they have remained close enough to the grassroots in their own countries to understand, share and communicate, from experience, the problems and aspirations of their fellow countrymen, and frame appropriate policies in the wider context of international power politics and economics.

Let us see, then, how some of the plenary papers, first, tackle these issues. One of the most interesting, for me, was the paper by the absent Jimoh Omo-Fadaka, partly because it fitted my own childhood experience in East Africa. He analysed the difference between Keynesian and Marxist economic theories and the failure of either of them to have any relevance to peasant economies like, for example, those in Africa, "the economies of African countries are agrarian and small-scale in which face-to-face communal ties of family, kinship, neighbourhood, common ancestry and religious obligations account for production being organised and controlled by social institutions locally". (P 8 p.5) He cited President Nyerere of Tanzania to illustrate the difference between the communalism or communitarian ethos of African societies, in contradistinction to the communism of Soviet socialism. He sees strength within African society that can be built on to create a different, more appropriate form of eco-development than either the Western or Eastern forms of what are basically similar forms of mass economy.

In summary, Omo-Fadaka emphasised a decentralised, bottom-to-top or what he prefers to call a 'bioregional' form of development, using ecologically-based low-impact technologies organised at village level. But he also feels that the preservation of African culture and identity is vitally important in any consideration of a global culture. - "The whole point of being international and cosmopolitan, in perspective, is to be able to go somewhere, or receive a visitor and say 'This is my culture, my place, and I share it with you, and what is your culture about?'" (ibid. p.7)

Ali Nasrui was one of the few plenary speakers who made listening a pleasure with his resonant voice, clear flow of ideas and a charismatic presence. His talk on 'Post-Liberation Movements' focussed on the role of class, race and sex,
drawing attention to peculiar contradictions that emerge in the transition from theory to practice. He showed how, time after time, those who eventually capture the state are, in fact, captured by it, because "whoever controls the state is compulsively tempted to preserve it. If the controller was originally class conscious, he or she becomes state conscious." (*P 7, p.6.)

Though Masrui considers that socialism is culturally more suitable for Africa, due to the historic link between capitalism and imperialism, he finds, nevertheless, that ethnic consciousness is stronger than class consciousness, and that African languages just do not lend themselves to Marxist concepts based on 'class' terms.

On the potential of the feminist movement, he indicated how the early comparability of men and women, under capitalism, had led to the domination of women by men as African economies became mechanised through internationalisation. In a metaphorical comparison of capitalism with the 'Titanic', he suggested that the feminist movement was the tip of one iceberg, while the peace movement was another. "The destiny of the world may depend on these social and political movements which seek to increase the role of women in decisions about war and peace, the role of workers in decisions about production and consumption, and the role of oppressed political groups in decisions between tyranny and freedom." (*P 7, p.22)

Another impressive and emotionally harrowing paper was delivered by Rudolfo Stavenhagen, of El Colegio de Mexico, who focused on the history and current situation of American Indians in Latin America, - a test-case of the 'multicultural/pluralist' debate. He cited the shocking historical record of "their extermination, enslavement, serfdom, oppression, pillage, exploitation, betrayal and expropriation, by the representatives of the dominant society, whether colonial administration, national government, Church, landowning class or multinational corporation." (*P 5, p.2)

In view of all this, he found it surprising that so many different ethnic groups had survived, given the hundreds of Indian societies which are known to have disappeared, from diverse causes, whether being hunted to death, or being exterminated through deliberate infection by smallpox-riddled blankets.

Stavenhagen described the 'culturalist' (or 'integrationist') approach of social scientists as being most widely accepted, - an approach which accepts
the likely absorption of the minority cultures by the dominant national Spanish culture, the 'indigenista' policy of many Latin American countries. Traditional Marxist analysis, he said, also "tends to favour the disappearance of the Indian ethnic groups as such." Both these approaches, however, are rejected by what he calls the 'civilisational' approach, which attempts to "interpret the persistence and significance of Indian ethnicity in its own terms rather than with an analysis of global society." (*P 9, p.16)

As an example of this, "the most recent Interamerican Indianist Congress held in Mexico in 1980 broke for the first time with the traditional integrationist approach, and openly espoused a multi-cultural solution to the so-called Indian problem in Latin America." (*P 9, p.10)

For the first time, then, a self-identified Indian is a presidential candidate in Mexico, and the ruling party admits for the first time that Mexico is a multi-national state. (*P 9, p.12) This example shows an unexpected strength of feeling among the people of Mexico that the differences are important, and should be allowed to remain rather than be absorbed, diluted and ultimately destroyed. As a model for the 'planetary culture' concept, it seems that linguistic and ethnic factors seem to count much more than anthropologists and social scientists have formerly appreciated.

In Group 3, concerned with 'Mass Communications and Participation', there were three contributions from Third World participants, - one, from Thailand, is currently studying at the East-West Center in Honolulu, while the other two came from Thailand and Peru. Despite their obviously privileged education, none of them supported the traditional viewpoints of Third World elites, so far as I could tell.

Boonrak Boonyaketmala, in reference to the imposition of a protective tariff on foreign films in Thailand in 1976, was deeply critical of the role of the Thai civilian and military elites in their promotion of the interests of the Motion Picture Export Association of America. Their understanding of and liking for the values of the capitalist world system was, he said, greater
than their understanding of their own society, and they (including some of the Thai film producers) clung to their cultural linkage with that system because they had come to see themselves as separate and above the traditional oriental culture. (III 3, p. 11ff)

The dilemma for developing, non-aligned countries in relation to 'cultural imperialism', was, he suggested, "a high level of well-informed selectivity, .... a critical selectivity of technology, process, and information, based as far as possible on self-determined national (community) needs and aspirations. (III 3, p.14,qu.12)

Uvais Ahamed was also from Thailand, working in a Unesco post in the Broadcast Development Institute. He showed how, as in other examples, the traditional indigenous culture was basically 'communalist' or 'cooperative' in structure, and that competitive individualism formed a new value system, learnt through exposure to the Western economic system. He blamed misrepresentation of the 'illusory Eldorado' of urban existence for the self-destructive migration from rural to urban areas, with its resulting problems of overcrowding, unemployment, problems of health, nutrition, sanitation, and air and noise pollution from factories and traffic.

Ahamed felt that a different kind of representation of appropriate uses of science and technology in an acceptable "style and form, language and idiom" (III 1, p. 5) might have helped prevent such a migration. He carefully qualifies the extent of the mass media role in changing long-held attitudes, but illustrated ways in which participatory use of radio and television could be used to improve mass awareness of relevant social and technical issues. However, ultimately, "any change can be effective and successful only if it is initiated by the people themselves, with their full involvement and participation in decision-making, planning and implementation." (III 1, pp.2-3)

From Peru had come Armando Robles Godoy, the son of a famous composer and folklorist, whose concern with the arts had led him into making 'shoe-string' budget films with trainee film students. He had just come from a Russian film festival for third world countries, where his two black/white films about his father had just won the main prize in the short film category. His paper concentrated on the potential role of visual 'language' for communicating across cultures, "to unify and actualise humanity" in a politically fragmented world. (III 5, p. 10) But he was well aware of the political manipulation of science and technology for Western industrial 'progress', -"Pragmatic politics belongs, exclusively, to yesterday's humanity.... although, paradoxically, it manipulates present culture and science." (III 5, p.7)
In the working group on 'Cultural and Religious Resurgence', Majid Rahnema provided another eloquent reminder, of the strong Third World voice supporting the theme of multi-cultural, pluralist development. The dominant Western culture has, he believes, accumulated a technological and financial power base which virtually prevents the development of 'authentic cultural resurgence' yet he believes that "the authentic cultures of the Third World, as they are developing (which literally means the stripping off of their 'envelopes' of dependency) are still fortuitously alive and amazingly fit to resist the continuous assaults of cultural hegemonism." (VI 5, p.11)

In a refreshingly frank critique of the W.F.S.F.'s Conference background notes, in the March '82 Newsletter, Rahnema wrote that "ethnocentric trends are present even in the minds of many intellectuals deeply committed to respect for other cultures." (VI 5, p.5). He provided his own version of how the notes for his working group might have been set out in an alternative form, laying particular emphasis on the rights of emerging cultures for 'legitimacy', for "sovereignty over their natural resources, of their right to develop their own political or other institutions according to their own needs." (VI 5, p.13) Such legitimacy also raises, he admitted, the 'complicated' matter of "the redistribution of power, of wealth and of access to key economic and political positions."(VI 5, p.12) Similar to the implications of the Brandt commission reports, this implies that "the wealthier and more powerful must abandon some of their excessive privileges in favour of the least privileged" (VI 5, p.12)

Fundamentalism

One of the lesser themes of the conference was the rise of fundamentalism, in both developed and developing countries. Majid Rahnema was one of the few speakers who referred to this issue, pointing out that fundamentalism was not exclusive to the fanatical Iranian version of Islam under Khomeini, but was also present in the values of President Reagan, President Brezhnev (before his death), and also, by implication, Mrs. Thatcher. They "all believe that there are fundamental truths not to be questioned by anyone ... whoever does not agree with them is a potential threat to their world and should therefore be 'reformed' or treated as an enemy," (VI 5, p.14)

As they become prisoners of their own power systems, such leaders create an increased potential for domestic totalitarianism and international conflict. In conclusion, he felt that there were signs for hope in the international development of a countervailing 'cultural resurgence', which
aimed at checking the "dangerously inhibiting trends of the dominant culture with the overwhelming political, economic and technological means at its disposal." (VI 5,p.17)

Towards evaluation of Third World views?

One of the many difficulties involved in assessing such Third World views lies in the informational gap that separates the educated urban élites from the rural poor. Would the latter 'really' wish to remain in the country, the westerner might ask, even if they had access to an exclusively indigenous media culture which projected careful advice on the use of appropriate agricultural, medical and informational technologies? There is no easy answer to this. It is easy to say, on one hand, that the attractions of the Western lifestyle would become dominant if given fair exposure. Or that they have a right to try out western consumerism, even if it turned out to be the disaster that so many westerners now claim. On the other hand, there are grounds for believing that the 'cultured élites', living a western, materialist lifestyle, actually promulgate the indigenous culture for the majority in their countries for political reasons, - to maintain their own dominant position of power in the national culture. The issues involve classic planning dilemmas about the balance between democracy and freedom of access to information, on the one hand, with long-term goals that an 'expert' planning élite might argue are in the best interests of the majority in a particular country. I would need more information from Institutes of Development Studies (e.g. at Sussex University), more sympathetic media coverage in depth of Third World issues and, probably, first hand experience before feeling confident of the issues. But such issues are of growing relevance to all those who would like to see a peaceful evolution of a global democracy, and all aspects of such situations need more open discussion.

Pluralism in Global Culture

Such issues are, of course, linked with the debate on the desirability or not of a pluralistic world culture, in which diverse cultures, accepted as different but equal in terms of their right to exist, provided they do not aggress and destroy each other. The literature of SF is particularly full of the contrary expectation or scenario whereby a single, unified planetary culture, with one basic language and socio-economic structure, becomes dominant throughout the world, - a view shared, if only subconsciously, by many futurists, I suspect. To refer back to the differences between the W.F.S. and the W.F.S.F., some make a semantic connection between the W.F.S.
repeated use of the word 'future' (singular) and the W.F.S.F. preference for
the plurality, 'futures', - the singular having overtones of inevitability
and unity, while the plural is more suggestive of alternatives and a plurality of
different cultural futures. I doubt, however, that the W.F.S. intended such an
implication when their objectives were drawn up! Nevertheless, there is a
strong Third World feeling that 'cultural imperialism' is a particularly
N. American and Western concomitant of free enterprise capitalism.

As far as I understand official American policy, in the communications field,
it is claimed that free enterprise is not inconsistent with pluralistic
cultural development, and that, on the contrary, the U.S. is prepared, for
instance, to help developing countries train their own journalists and technicians
for Third or Fourth World News Agencies and for self-development. What tends to
be underplayed or omitted from such a viewpoint is the argument that the sheer
size and momentum of western technology and its transmission through multinational
corporations is almost bound, through 'integration' and 'diversification' in
corporate strategy, to lead to initial technical domination followed by cultural
influence, absorption and domination, - i.e. leading to adoption of the
competitive capitalist values which are associated with the design, function and
'packaging' of the technologies.

In the futurist field it is fairly easy to identify those who see the results
of free enterprise capitalism as being largely beneficial and self-correcting
in terms of a global ecological balance and human survival. There is strong
tendency for these people to regard a unified planetary culture of modified
free enterprise as being a natural and unavoidable direction for human
development. Those, however, who believe there are strong connections between
the spheres of government, industry and research, through a mutually supportive
'military-industrial-academic complex' find it difficult to avoid the implication
that nuclear arms and energy policies are ecologically and economically
destabilising and likely to lead to major disasters and conflicts, either
accidentally, or, with modern 'first-strike' capability (or assumed capability),
deliberately. While there is no necessary connection between capitalism and
a unitary planetary culture, it is worth noting how many, in one's experience,
are supporters of both, or critical of both, because of assumed interconnections.

Before moving on to further conference topics of 'power', 'leadership', 'world order'
it seems a reasonable place to pause and look at the representation aspect of
Third World participation in W.F.S.F. conferences.
Participation by Developing Countries

As I suggested earlier, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the W.F.S.F. conferences is the policy of deliberately including international perspectives through representative speakers and delegates from the less developed countries.

Some idea of their views on capitalism and socialism, and cultural pluralism has already been considered. However, it is not easy to be sure precisely how 'authentic' such 'Third World' voices really are, in terms of the long-term economic/cultural benefit to the lesser developed majorities. So it seemed to me worth trying to analyse roughly what balance of Third World participation was present at and contributed papers to the Stockholm conference, and compare this with the proportions at Kyoto (2:1970) and Rome (4:1973), which are the only other figures I can find easily.

In Table II (ii) one can see that twelve countries were represented as 'L.D.C.s', comprising seventeen (8.5%) of the two hundred participants, and in II (ii) their contribution in terms of papers comes to 10%. As indicated, several of those speakers and participants who were born in one of the Third World countries have since moved to one or another of the more advanced western countries. As a methodological convenience, I have counted these in two ways, putting their current country in one column. (One could equally argue that their experience is so valuable that they should count as extra units, having doubled their sense of cultural heritage!) I have added a second column showing what the figure would be on the basis of country of origin, 'c-o'. It is arguable that the 'country of origin' is much the most crucial factor in terms of shaping one's worldview and cultural consciousness. However, the elitist factors which lead to a western education and immigration from the country of origin throw some doubt on the authenticity of some who become 'Third World representatives in the West or 'North'. (I realise that in many cases it is precisely because of support for the grassroots in their country of origin that some are driven from their own countries by conservative or elitist ruling factions.)

On the basis of the second column, for country of origin, the L.D.C.s provided 11.1% of the participants and 18.8% of the papers. While if we look at the Plenary papers on their own, we can see that exactly half of the listed papers were given by speakers whose country of origin was in the Third World.
If we return, however, to the other main groups of participants and presenters, we find that the Swedes (42.2%) and other Europeans (31.7%) comprised between them seventy-four per cent of the conference delegates, and provided sixty-two per cent of the papers on the basis of country-of-origin, quite clearly dominating the conference in a numerical sense. On the same basis, the N.Americans provided about nine per cent of the papers; Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia another six per cent between them; while Israel and S.Africa made up the balance of four per cent of presenters. It is interesting to note that the Japanese, who dominated the 1970 conference in Kyoto (see Table III), had only one representative at Stockholm, and none at the Rome conference (1973). Another group, notable by its absence at any of these conferences, is the newly rich 'Fourth World' of Arab countries.

The third part of Table II is concerned briefly with the role of women in attending and contributing papers to the Stockholm conference. As is usual at futures conferences, the proportion is low, but higher than at most of the conferences I have attended. Most of the forty-four women present were from Europe, and only one was from a 'developing country' (Mrs. N.A. Butt, from Pakistan). None of the ten papers given by women was a plenary paper, and more than half were given by Europeans, half of whom were Swedes. Nevertheless, women did provide fifteen per cent of all the papers. It might be interesting for someone to compare these figures with attendance at W.F.S. conferences, and see if any trends emerge.

In Table III there is a brief analysis of the papers contributed to the Kyoto and Rome conferences for comparison.

As far as I could tell, almost everyone attending these two conferences had prepared a paper, though at Kyoto there may have been nearly fifty participants who were not listed as presenters, making a total of two hundred and eighty altogether. The analysis is based, however, purely on the numbers of those who provided papers.

Naturally, at Kyoto, the host country, Japan, had the highest proportion, about forty-seven per cent of the total number of papers (245). Europeans still provided a quarter of the papers, and N.Americans another fifth. The L.D.C.s had nine presenters, and two absentee presenters, making five per cent of the total. The Russian satellite countries are shown at three per cent, while Israel and Australia counted for another two per cent. Finally, China had a single representative.

Many of the papers given at Kyoto have a stimulating relevance today, for we have not yet solved most of the problems discussed! The proceedings were published in several volumes, amounting to some fifteen hundred pages, and similarly for the Rome (1973) conference.
The second part of Table III lists the papers which formed the discussion background to the Rome conference, about half the number of the Kyoto conference, though the publication length was very similar.

Italy had a much smaller proportion of papers than the host countries in 1970 and at Stockholm in 1982, and the L.D.C.s had nearly 18%, slightly lower than 1982, but well up on 1970. The N.American share was higher than either, with over 24%, while Europe was lower with under 29%. The contribution from Russian satellite countries was about the same as at Stockholm, more than double the Kyoto delegation. However, as in other examples, the L.D.C.s were still outnumbered 5:1 by other groups.

Again there is a brief list of female participation in the Rome conference, in the third part of the Table. One of the eleven women contributors was from Venezuela, which I have counted as an L.D.C, while others came from Israel, Romania, N.America and Europe, including one from Italy. They comprised only nine per cent of the total number of presenters, considerably lower than at Stockholm, where fifteen percent of papers were given by women, a trend in the right direction, anyway!

One aspect of the Russian satellite participation, which is not visible in the Table, is that Czechoslovakia and Romania, which had five delegates listed at Kyoto, had no representation at Stockholm, while Hungary, not present in Kyoto, provided half the communist block group in Stockholm. On the other hand, Yugoslavia and Poland sent seven to Kyoto and five to Stockholm, keeping a more even interest. Internal politics invariably affect attendance of representatives from Russian satellite countries, and one can almost count on a third of listed delegates not arriving, though nothing is predictable in this area of rationed freedoms.

After this brief diversion into some of the quantifiable aspects of three rather different W.F.S.F. conferences, let us return to some of the qualitative issues in the Stockholm conference of 1982, beginning with the crucial issue of disarmament.

Peace and Disarmament

The plenary session most deeply concerned with peace and disarmament was given by Richard Falk, Professor of Law and Practice at Princeton University. That text was not available, but he contributed a paper on 'Nuclear Weapons and the End of Democracy' to the working group on 'Militarisation of Politics and Politicisation of the Military', and that was.

Falk's theoretical position has much in common with the Third World representatives, already cited earlier, in emphasising the domination and control...
of world economics by western multinational corporations and banks, and also by supposedly democratic governments which are prepared to ignore, if necessary, the will of their citizens in the provision of military deterrents, and in considering their use without prior consultation. In particular, he argues that the very existence of nuclear weapons "interferes with democratic governance in fundamental ways." (IV 3, p.2)

He referred to the relevance of Gino Germani's work, which I am not familiar with, but also to E.P. Thompson's historical contribution which I do know something about. - Thompson, he said, is one of the few Europeans who has made the connection between democracy and the nuclear arms issue, writing once that "the a priori condition for the extermination of the European peoples is the extermination of open democratic process." (IV 3, p.8) For Thompson saw the connection between restrictions on access to information, on access to knowledge about individual rights, as the basis on which nuclear strategy could survive. In a recent full page article in the Guardian, Thompson has tried again to awaken his C.N.D. and socialist friends to the importance of tackling the human rights issues at the same time as disarmament. 17

The most striking, positive line, for me, in Falk's argument, (developed with Lee Mayrovitz and Jack Sanderson), is that the international 'law of war' is inconsistent with the nationalistic use of nuclear weaponry. - Its "central prohibition of indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians and ... separate prohibitions for weapons that cause victims 'unnecessary suffering' or disproportionate damage." (IV 3, p.11) Perhaps hopefully, he suggests that "There is no way for a democratic political leadership to retain its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry for very long if a sustained campaign around the legal and moral status of nuclear weapons is mounted." (IV 3, p.13).

This approach, assuming its validity, is obviously important in the development of the nuclear debate, but I have only recently begun to see any signs that journalists in the U.K. media have any idea about the legality aspect. In his conclusion, Falk believes he can see the beginning of a democratic revival, - part of a comprehensive world order solution, involving the delegitimisation of the state in the area of national security. For this reason, he concluded, "the religious, medical and legal campaign against nuclearism seems of vital relevance to the very possibility of a democratic revival." (IV 3, p. 15)

For balance, Godfried van den Bergh, of the Hague Institute of Social Studies, titled his paper, in the same group, 'Two Scorpions in a Bottle: The Unintended Benefits of Nuclear Weapons,' - a metaphor drawn from J. Robert Oppenheimer's comparison of Russia and America, as two scorpions, sitting
tight in a bottle, instinctively knowing that attacking the other would result in death. This is known in contemporary jargon as 'mutually assured destruction' (MAD) (MIV 2, p.3) However, van den Bergh assures us that "MAD is now quite stable and will remain so in the foreseeable future" (MIV 2, p. 5) In fact he thinks that, with conscious planned effort by governments, political parties and peace movements, he sees it as the "best prospect for the development of a more peaceful world." (MIV 2, p.8) The peace movements, therefore, "would be wise to base their strategies on the unintended benefits of nuclear weapons." (MIV 2, p. 9) Convinced?

In the same group, Kjell Skjelsbaek (Oslo) and Tatu Vanhanen, of the University of Tampere, Finland, drew on S.I.P.R.I.'s massive collations of military budget figures, and details of the economies and politics of weapons-exporting countries to make an interesting hypothesis. That there was an increased likelihood of continued autocratic or military rule in Third World countries, given likely, low distributions of economic and intellectual power resources, where the legitimacy of a civilian-leadership was weak, and military spending and autonomy at a high level. Vanhanen suggested that "democracy will emerge where crucial power resources are so widely distributed among competing groups that no group is able to suppress the other groups and establish and uphold its hegemony." (IV 7, p. 13)

Since the hundred and thirty or so wars which have broken out since the Second World War have all been in Third World countries, such research is of considerable relevance to world order studies. This group, discussing 'The Militarisation of Politics and the Politicisation of the Military' demonstrated a particularly high standard of research and imaginative application of historical and statistical data to 'the future'.

Leadership and Participation

Several related issues were considered by Group IV, despite its small membership of three. Glenn Paige's excellent paper on 'Nonviolence and Future Forms of Leadership' considered the likelihood of military forms of political leadership being the most probable modes of leadership throughout the world over the next half century. But he concentrated more on the emergence of the more desirable 'political theory of nonviolent revolution', citing examples of different kinds of nonviolent leadership in the lives of Gandhi, Luther King, Esquivel, Ariyaratne, Chavez, Doloi, and Abdul Ghaffer Khan.

Like Boonyaketsana, Omo-Fadaka and others, Paige considers the "continuance of the military-industrial-academic-media complex as the most potent factor" likely to influence political leadership, and contribute to a growing arms trade. (*II 1, p.9) Somewhat similar to Vanhanen's conclusions, Paige argues
that this growth, "combined with the population explosion, failures of economic systems, and tendencies for weapons to be used in domestic repression and international conflict will contribute to the militarisation of dominant leadership and to the desperate emergence of revolutionary military leadership."

(*II 1, p.9)

There are four principal factors, he discerns, which will contribute towards the acceptance of non-violent leadership, and he believes that as "hundreds of millions of people arrive at four simple ideas, the long night of historical violence will end: stop the killing, shift resources to human needs, help one another; and join together globally to prevent the emergence of violent political leadership and to strengthen nonviolent alternatives." (*II 1, p.11 my emphasis) He sees, though, that the kind of changes required, involving careful analytical work on the causes of violence, nonviolence, and the transformation of one to the other require understanding of total system change requirements, and would involve, if followed through, "an ethical-empirical paradigm shift in the normal procedures of seeking and using knowledge in conventional political science." (*II 1, p.12)

The second paper in group II was by Henryk Skolimowski, a Polish philosopher, now at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His analysis of 'The Reality and Illusions of Power' had a refreshing breadth of vision which stood out, for me, as one of the more memorable papers of the conference, - though I see that it has not been chosen for the W.F.S.F. publications arranged to date. Perhaps he is too idealistic, and lacking the economic parameters which would make his work more popular among the pragmatists of this world. But there are more and more politicians, boardroom chairmen and futurists, I suspect, who are gradually adopting his approach towards redefining 'power' and human relationships.

He regards "the changing outlook on power " as representing " a changing outlook on human nature." (II 2, p.5) For the present concept of power is simply "an enactment of one specific myth of power" (II 2, p.16, my emphasis) As one would expect from his 'ecological' stance, Skolimowski holds the view that "power does not reside in objects: it resides in systems - biological, social, cultural, spiritual," and in the relations between systems, - an individual person being one example of a complex system.(II 2, p.11, my emphasis) For example he cited the American Indians, among other examples, as "enclaves of an alternative reality, where 'old shamanism' has prevailed, where the belief in power as moral authority has been upheld....They did not accept the context; and consequently, they did not accept the corresponding myth, or the concept, of power." (II 2, p. 19)
He sees a strong connection between the development of science and technology, and cultural maps of perception, understanding and language, reinforcing the argument of such important books as Stanley's *The Technological Conscience* and Capra's *The Turning Point*. "It has been a tragedy for developing countries", he wrote, "indeed for all countries of non-western civilisations, that they accepted not only western science and technology, but also the myths that goes with science and technology. They also accepted the very language that conveys and perpetrates Western myths. The English language is a par excellence expression of western empiricism; and more recently of western scepticism and materialism... had Sanskrit - the language of wisdom - become the universal language, we would have had much less of a problem with power and with ourselves." (II 2, p. 20)

He is quite clear that he does not consider the replacement of capitalism by communism or the main forms of industrial socialism as the answer, since they are all "based on the conception of power as domination, class struggle, antagonism and warfare" (II 2, p. 24), and would merely mean "replacing one vicious context of power with another vicious context." (II 2, p. 25)

Skolimowski believes, rather, that we must go to the very roots of our civilisation, to the very roots of what he calls, rather cumbersomely, "the Paracelsian/Machiavellian/ Baconian/ Galilean/ Faustian/ Marxist/ Leninist/ Taylorian tradition" (II 2, p. 25)-Capra's 'Hartesian-Newtonian framework' seems too easy by half! (e.g. 18 p. 420). The terms 'progress' and the 'good life' must, Skolimowski feels, be redefined, and the notion of 'elegant frugality' enshrined, while 'reality' should be redefined in terms of a 'new form of participation in life'. The language and reality of love are, he feels, an integral part of the new paradigm, which "will inform us of another reality of power... when people become wiser, love will assume its rightful place as an advisor on all things, including power." (II 2, p. 22)

He has the faith that we shall find the means to bring about the new vision, when we find it sufficiently 'compelling and necessary'.

He admits, finally, that he has only sketched out the conditions necessary for a new paradigm of power, and calls on others to join him and "articulate the details of the structure that is latent "in his discourse."

The other paper in this group, by Stojanović, of Belgrade, Yugoslavia, indicates, perhaps, something of the kind of critical analysis of Marxism allowed in Yugoslavia, - a country which has such independence that it is a little unfair to lump it in with other 'satellites' of Russian communism. Stojanović distinguishes clearly between dictatorial and democratic Marxism, exemplifying
Poland as having passed from 'distorted' to 'false' to 'mendacious' consciousness - the last and worst stage. He is critical of much of Marx' theoretical work, and in relation to his notion of 'ideology', he suggests a new concept 'ideal-logy' to refer to "a set of ideals that is used by a social group at the expense of truth to discredit the existing order and justify their own activity against it in the name of a new social order." (II 3, p.15) This was an uneven, bitty paper, and seemed to show no familiarity with the best western scholarship on Marx, - but then, why should it?

Decentralisation and Devolution and the Civil Service (Group I)

Three of the most pertinent papers in the conference on the actual practice of politics were in this group, which focused on the legislative and civil service roles. However, as in most other groups, there was little time spent on provocative or speculative ideas about the future. Hans Esping captured the feelings of many others when he admitted that the purpose of his paper was "not to ponder what sort of futures are desirable, but to make some observations on the restriction on our freedom of choice.... Few of the visionaries treat the obstacles to, and the needed timespan for, structural change with due respect to the difficulties involved..... I freely admit I have no facile solutions and will limit myself to an analysis of some of the difficulties." (I 2, p.2)

Gunnar Gustafsson, of Umeå University's Department of Political Science, drew a Kafka-like picture of the direction of present decision-making policies in some western democracies, due to the diffusion of power in three main directions, - amongst national governing bodies, amongst national, regional and local levels of the permanent bureaucracies, and amongst private and public agencies.

She shows how changes in policy at one level may be carried out by people (e.g. architects) at another level, whose occupational ethics and training resist full implementation of the policy. Uncertainties about means and goals, inconsistent demands from different parliamentary parties, which have too short a life to see the long-term effect of their policies results in what she calls 'symbolic policy' (decisions which are never intended to be fully implemented) and 'pseudo-policy', when politicians do not base their decisions on available facts in preparing their policy proposals. (I 5, p.7)

Interestingly enough, she found that policies were often implemented despite a high degree of 'pseudo-orientation'!

A little paradoxically, she discovered that those in power, trying desperately to manage an almost impossible situation, seem eager to stress, in public, their capacity to solve problems and the concreteness of what
issues they can. With the usual media emphasis on 'personal' aspects, and
excluding those issues which do not make good visual 'News', the result is
"extreme oversimplification of the social complexity when analysed or described
in public. Policy is thus increasingly presented as real at the same time
as it becomes more pseudo-oriented and symbolic." (I 5, p. 11, my emph.). For
real policy choices to be made, Gunnar Gustafsson believes that some experiments,
e.g. on aspects of decentralisation vs. centralisation, need to run for ten
years or so to evaluate the longer term implications of imposing such policy
on a national basis.

Federalism, ideology and an evaluation of capitalism

Another excellent paper, discussed by the same working group (I), was
provided by one of the better known plenary contributors, Mihailo Marković,
from Belgrade. In this paper he concentrated on the notion of federalism,
in the context of a political culture which must combine "genuine pluralism
with a universal emancipatory rationality" (I 6, p.18).

He reminded me sometimes of the more idealistic aspirations of some of
the new Social Democratic & Liberal Alliance party in the U.K., as in his
hopeful suggestion that "the party will be transcended by a political
organisation that aspires to educate and not to rule, to prepare rational
solutions rather than to decide about them, to build up criteria of evaluation
rather than evaluate itself; to engage in dialogues in order to clear up issues
rather than to settle them, backed by governmental power. Under such conditions,
pluralism of political life will no longer be pluralism of entrenched class
interests struggling for domination, but pluralism of visions, of options, of
imaginative approaches in a really free society." (I 6, p.34, my emph.)

Marković was one of the few speakers, in my view, who really understands
the relevance and nature of 'ideology' in futurist studies, - "One of the
functions of ideology is to legitimate dominating power, the other is to
conceal existing forms of exploitation." (I 6, p.7, my emph.) This leads him
to condemn both totalitarianism and "egoistic individualism with its glaring
social inequalities", for denying that "human beings have an inherent
capacity to understand what social needs are and what would be the rational
way to meet them." (I 6, p. 11)

Like the majority of presenters cited so far, his view of the multinational
corporations was, somewhat narrowly, concerned with the low wage, capital
intensive nature of their Third World investment, usually favouring the ruling
élite and not the population as a whole. However, he was prepared to discuss
varying degrees of 'decentralism' given a variety of real world contexts.

In his plenary talk, 'Towards a Rational and Just World Order', he analysed
the pros and cons of the 'New International Economic Order' proposals, pointing out the dangers of encouraging the multiple dependency on 'turn-key' factories (complete packages of technology). In relation to the 'Western paradigm of development and lifestyle' he summed up the positive values as "respect for individual liberties and human rights, an openness towards innovation, a very active attitude towards the world, and instrumental rationality and practical efficiency which are always needed in pursuit of well selected goals." (P 6, p.8) However, he found seven aspects worthy of 'critical reevaluation'. These included over-consumption, unlimited exponential growth, reliance on a GNP measure which does not relate to basic needs or a just distribution of wealth, wasteful capital-intensive production, big centralised systems, bureaucratisation and a "style of life characterised by preference for non-manual activities, material comfort, privacy, security, growing mediation in human relations, and an 'investment-return' approach to other individuals." (P 6, p.8)

In spite of his belief that the 'New International Economic Order' as proposed is likely to play the ideological function of preserving the existing world order, "just one more ideological device of contemporary imperialism", he also says that "like most social-democratic projects, it may be the best possibility under the circumstances... if properly interpreted and translated into practice." He sees the backing of the non-aligned movement as a particular point in its favour. He sees the new concept of development as being "relative to basic human needs, to specific cultural values,... and towards technological self-reliance," and having "a real emancipatory significance". (P 6, p.13, my emph.)

**Mass Communications and Participation**

Some of the contributors to Group III have already been mentioned in connection with the presentation of Third World viewpoints (Boonyakettmala, Ahamed and Godoy). But the role of 'communications' has barely been mentioned, except to wonder whether, as the last W.F.S.F. conference in Cairo had focussed particularly on 'Communication and Cultural Identity', the subject had now been consigned to the peripheries of W.F.S.F. thinking. For, as far as I can recall, none of the main plenary sessions, apart from a reference by Yehezkel Dror and oblique indications by Marković to 'technological dependency', even mentioned the relevance of communications for 'the future of politics'.

Yehezkel Dror's main focus, in his plenary talk, was on the training of elites for "societal-architecture-steering-understanding" (*P 3, p.13) and on redesigning governance on a national level as a prerequisite for solving the problems of global governance. Where 'communications' were important, in his scheme, was in providing the enlightened public opinion which he considered essential to any form of new democracy. He mentioned that the failure
of most countries to do this due to the great inertia of "crucial governance institutions", "despite the recognised need to do so and the availability of relatively risk-low means for doing so. Thus, good analysis of main societal choices on television and completely restructured school teaching of societal problems, and ways to analyse them, are feasible, with controllable dangers, and very neglected even in the most advanced democracies." (*P 3, p.9, my emphasis)

The working group on 'Mass Communications and Participation' was more concerned with the role of economics and 'media imperialism' in preventing the independent, pluralistic development of Third World countries, and on the role of communications in increasing democratic participation through the 'Electronic Town Meeting' (Jim Dator) and electronic voting (Sam Lehman-Wilzig). Apart from Armando Godoy's screening of his two film entries for the Russian film festival, Jim Dator's video extracts of the Hawaiian T.V. experiment, in opening up economic/political discussions to a wider public, were the only audio-visual input to the conference sessions.

Sam Lehman-Wilzig, an American educated lecturer at Bar-Ilan University in Israel, focused on the technicalities of providing a qualitative dimension to electronic voting procedures, - allowing for individual's intensity of feeling about certain issues or candidates to be registered through one of a variety of weighted voting systems. This raises a number of increasingly important issues affecting the future of democracy (or 'democracy' as he rather perversely prefers to call the new relationship). He cites the mega-forum 'Alternatives for Washington', State and New Zealand's more recent 1981 Televote as successful examples of the mega-forum in action. But he barely touches on the major problem Dror referred to, of how our presently ignorant societies can be encouraged or educated enough to be sufficiently informed to participate in such advanced voting procedures. He does, however, make some suggestions about balancing the power of voting during a transition period. He made no attempt, I felt, to deal with one of the major criticisms of such a system, that the benefactors would most likely be the more educated, more highly motivated and more communicative members of the society, i.e. the 'middle class' (in British terms) and the broadly similar group of communications/computer enthusiasts. But his paper does at least open up a number of the discussion areas which deserve much more attention, - and soon.

Michael Marien's piece on 'The Discovery and Decline of the Ignorant Society, 1965-1985' made a useful contribution to this debate which should be read by more, in this context of communications and democracy. 19

A most succinct and useful summary of the value of computer conferencing
was given by Jacob Palme, of the Swedish National Defence Research Institute. Among the many conclusions of his Swedish research were that the optimum sizes of groups seemed to be between ten and eighty participants, and that new types of communication rather than replacement of existing forms of communication resulted from the use of computer conferencing facilities.

Palme's useful appendix included a summary of a workshop report on "Computer-based Conferencing Systems for Developing Countries", sponsored by the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa, during October 1981. The twelve recommendations go far to try and anticipate and forestall "the threat of scientific and technical disenfranchisement" for developing countries which could result if they are not consulted about and given sufficient technical and financial help in how to use and develop appropriate, low-cost computer-based conferencing systems. (III 8, pp.21-24)

This example picks up again the issue of multi-national corporations and their natural domination of developing countries in the information and communications areas, - seldom appreciated by those who support 'free-flow' of information policies. The cost of acquiring and interpreting satellite surveys to help assess the value of their own mineral resources and energy potentials has sometimes resulted in L.D.C.s being less well equipped at the bargaining table than the multinational representatives who apply for survey and extraction leases. The technical and informational aspects are just as crucial as the financial in such negotiations. Despite the publicity given to the North-South Programme for Survival (1977-80), the Brandt Commission's sequel, Common Crisis (1983) indicates that the North-South gaps are increasing rather than narrowing, that the relations between industrial and developing nations are deteriorating rather than improving.

Information technology and women

My last reference to the 'Mass Communications' group concerns the shared contribution by Anne Witebsky and Christopher Jones, two of Jim Dator's political science students at the Manoa campus in Honolulu. They jointly presented key sections of their paper on 'Feminist Futures and Information Technology'. There were many pertinent conclusions and hypotheses, including reference to Cronberg and Sangregorio's study of the Japanese interactive video communities, indicating that the new technologies reflected "men's structural biases towards reinforcing women's present role in the household" (III 6, p.7) and failed to test out, in an imaginative manner, possibilities for social change.
Another concern of theirs was the potential role of informational technology to further "isolate women from work and friendship opportunities"(III 6, p.8). The negligible U.S. network news coverage of women's issues on work and sex discrimination was another (III 6, p.6). Again, the role of multinational corporations was criticised, this time in connection with the employment of female workers in Asia, at fractional rates, followed by casual sacking, as soon as was economically convenient. They also touched on the gross undervaluation of women's 'work' in the GNP, and the role of language in maintaining male dominance. The absence of women in technology assessment should be reversed, if possible, so that alternatives to pure market strategy can be found, which will lead to "modes of interaction which are non-exploitative, interactive and cooperative."(III 6, p.10) It was refreshing to see two young students take so much care to prepare and present their paper for such a distant W.F.S.F. conference. The W.F.S.F. and the W.F.S. would both do well to encourage more contributions of this calibre. I hope they find wider publication for their ambitious contribution to the W.F.S.F. working group.

Conclusions to the conference

For the late 'Closing Session' on June 8th, each working group had compiled a report on their conclusions and recommendations. However, things were running late and Jim Dator and Lars Ingelstam had little time to do more than summarise their own reactions in just a few minutes. For me, as for many others, this was a considerable disappointment, as the working groups provided a more meaningful experience and a sense of stimulating dialogue which was absent from most of the plenary sessions. To hear other groups' views both about the conference and about their own themes would have been an excellent end to the closing session. However, the W.F.S.F. has subsequently published, as part of its September Newsletter, the working group reports and general observations by Göran Bäckstrand, Jan Hjärpe and Michael Jefferson. 21 These form a succinct record of ideas raised at the conference which are beyond the scope of this review.

One omission so far, apart from the Business Meeting, is any mention of the Youth Forum, organised by Simon Nicholson of the Open University (U.K.). He arranged a workshop for a small group of Swedish schoolchildren to come and make slides and pictures, during the conference, to express their 'images of the future'. -The nuclear disaster scenario was surprisingly prominent, indicating something about Swedish schools and culture. Delegates could see the results on the last day, in a foyer behind the main plenary hall. The children should have had a few minutes to talk about their experience in the Closing Session, but somehow they were squeezed out, or had to leave before they were called.
Delegates' comments

Time was made in the Closing Session, however, for delegates' comments and reactions to this VIIth World Futures Research Conference, producing a notable difference in attitude between the older and younger generations. The former were generously congratulatory about the success and value of the conference, while two new young members from Sweden and Mexico were not so happy. They felt that the business meeting had been too concerned with finance to bother with the direction and style of the W.F.S.F. -The Swedish girl, from Lund, referred to the explicit aims of the W.F.S.F. "to provide a forum for debate in which exchange, confrontation, stimulation of ideas, visions and plans for the long-term future can take place." In short, she suggested that the conference lacked precisely the 'controversial, provocative and creative' experience she had come for.

There were all too few young delegates to the conference, and these last comments should not be dismissed without consideration for their relevance to future W.F.S.F. conferences. Though lip-service was paid to the importance of the Youth Forum, and the possibility of a children's section on futures in the Newsletter was discussed, it must be admitted that the conference was not geared towards the young, but rather for the middle-aged enthusiasts who have, for years, helped support and steer the W.F.S.F. There is, of course, nothing wrong in this, provided the requirements of this group are adequately met. But if the W.F.S.F./does have a policy for recruiting and involving the young, (and I just don't know whether or not this is so), the format of the Stockholm conference was not designed for it. But most associations welcome new membership, particularly from the young, and it was sad to see the young 'turned off' by this particular 'futures' conference.

As one of the younger middle-aged participants, some of my own observations may be relevant here. I commented earlier on my preference for the seminar format, though many would, no doubt, disagree with my assessment. One contributor, in the Communications group, made an interesting aside which I would like to recommend to conference organisers. -Jacob Palme was discussing the ratio of writing to reading in the 'teleconference' situations he had been describing and commented that humans will, for psychological reasons, "be more efficient if a reasonable part of their time is spent giving information, while they are dissatisfied and inefficient if they have to spend too much time passively receiving information." (III 2, p.17, my emphasis) I have sometimes heard it argued that major speakers are unlikely to accept an invitation to speak unless granted the customary, uninterrupted lecture time to read their paper. There is doubtless some truth in this, but I think it also likely that there are such speakers who are only too glad of the opportunity of discussing the key issues
at length with an audience which has largely read his/her paper in advance. Provided the questioners and audience are reasonably behaved, this can provide a highly stimulating occasion, rather than a harrowing one, for the speaker. An occasion more in tune, I feel, with the 'democratisation' of futures studies which the W.F.S.F. aims to promote.

I have also mentioned my surprise at the almost total lack of audio-visual presentations as part of the conference. Certainly, their over-use or incompetent use can be worse than no use at all. But if we are to pay anything but lip-service to all the research on left/right brain specialisation and integration, we should try to involve the aesthetic, visual, intuitive aspects of our personalities as well as challenging our intellects. Certainly some of the speakers were sometimes moving, and even poetic at times. But, considering the wealth of our global culture's audio-visual media and visual arts, I found the conference to be dominated by the style of the pre-T.V. and -I.T./ generation! Certainly, it requires money and organisation, but the qualitative rewards can make such an effort well worthwhile. So please, some slides, illustrations, films or copyright-cleared videorecordings next time! As the splendid Armando Robles Godoy wrote in his paper, in terms of the modern audio-visual communications world, "the politician exists in yesterday's universe, a universe of fifty or sixty years ago," due to the lack of synchrony between politicians and "human progress and evolution in its most important and significant areas (science, art, philosophy, technology, health, beauty, intelligence etc.)" (III 5, p. 4,7). I'm sure the W.F.S.F. can do better than the politicians!

In terms of the content of the conference papers, I was impressed by many papers, but felt at the same time that there were empty lacunae which I had hoped would take 'futures studies' a few steps further towards being a 'mature' area of academic research. - I remember a session on 'the future of futures studies' at the W.F.S. Toronto Assembly, when it was stated that the growth in self-critical research in futures studies augured well for its development towards a 'mature' phase, at least on the basis of analogy with other 'disciplines' (They too are sometimes over-ambitiously labelled, like Economics and the Social Sciences!). Two years later, at Stockholm, I found few signs that this evolutionary threshold was being crossed, and tended to concur with Michael Jefferson's verdict that "there was too little evidence of original thought, solid research, penetrating analysis, or vivid imagination" in many papers and discussions which followed. 21 If anything, there was a tone of retrenchment and consolidation, of retreat from over-ambitious visions and ideals to a somewhat cautious and disillusioned pragmatism, requiring longer periods of research and social experiment before we can make some
kinds of decisions (e.g. Gustafsson, I 5; Esping I 2.)

Another dimension of the conference, which still bothers me, is the apparent lack of coordinating perspectives in which the aims and content of the conference could be related back to the planning conferences and the previous World Futures Research Conferences. Long-term members would not have any worries here, but a newcomer, like myself, would have welcomed a little more 'framing' and context. I realise that the sheer breadth of issues, with eight different working groups tackling different aspects of 'The Future of Politics' makes such coordination an almost impossible task. Recent W.F.S.F. Newsletters provide some of the background to the conference, but there were several long-standing contributors (e.g. Jim Dator, Magda McHale, Miheilo Marković and Eleonora Masini) who have the expertise to evaluate, to some extent, where the W.F.S.F. has come from, and how far the conference may have contributed (or not) to moving it onwards. - On the other hand, too much 'guidance' and interpretation can become, all too easily, a tool of organisational control!

I am very aware of my own difficulty, in selecting examples from the sixty-nine papers, and realise the demands on anyone trying to offer a 'coordinating perspective'. I have virtually omitted, for example, any reference to the working groups on 'Ethnicity and the State', 'Governance in Crisis', and the one on 'Popular Movements'. In this last group, I particularly liked two papers, Andrew Jamison's informative history of 'The politics of environmentalism in Scandinavia' (V 2) and Knud Pedersen's 'The Revolution of the Open Hand - Reflections on the New Wave Grass-Root Movements in Nordic Countries' (*V 3). This 'revolution' had much in common with the 'Aquarian Conspiracy' movement in the States. I would also have liked to mention, space permitting, Kristian Gerner's look at Russian militarisation as an education from childhood (*IV 4), Rudolf Bahro's programme for various social movements, notably the 'Greens' who have subsequently proved so successful (*P 2), and Joseph Sempembwa's scholarly paper on the history of African religions and the present role of 'black theology in Africa (*VI 6).

The visit to the Swedish Secretariat for Futures Studies deserves an article on its own, providing a fascinating insight into the development of one of the most mature futures studies organisations. Interestingly, when the former director, Lars Ingelstam, left, a new system evolved in which the four project directors shared the directorial responsibilities on an equal basis.
Despite the differences between the W.F.S. and the W.F.S.F., there seems to be enough common ground to justify increased forms of cooperation. They are both involved in "democracy's greatest challenge .... public ignorance of increasingly complex problems," - "all of our problems are different facets of a single crisis of perception", to cite a most important Bulletin article by Marien. 22 There is a need amongst all futures organisations to debate the two main types of 'post-industrialist' scenarios, - "the service society or information society, characterised by high technology, material affluence and leisure", and the "decentralised, ecologically-oriented society largely employing appropriate or intermediate technology." 23 The U.N. emphasis of the W.F.S.F. needs to be juxtaposed with the U.S. oriented emphasis of the World Future Society. The W.F.S.F. could benefit from the experience and methodology of the W.F.S. rather more than at present.

Where the W.F.S.F. is largely funded by other, frequently international, bodies, the W.F.S. is determinedly independent of funding bodies for their normal running costs. But since the W.F.S. relies almost totally on voluntary contributions for both its publications and Assemblies, the result is bound to be a kind of vicious circle of supply and demand which militates against the inclusion of 'non-American' perspectives. In order to redress this, if indeed such a policy proved acceptable to its membership, - the W.F.S. should consider commissioning work from the various parts of the world which are currently under-represented due to lack of finance and incentive, and try to raise funds (e.g. from U.N. bodies) to subsidise members from the Third World at conferences. It might be useful to share the organisation of a conference with the W.F.S.F. to see how far the two organisations can work together. Another area for cooperation might be in recruitment policies, particularly in encouraging more women and more young members from both the 'advanced' countries, including Russia, and the L.D.C.s. They might also try to combine expertise in such crucial areas as consultancy for film and television series or programmes on aspects of global futures.

Since Michael Marien said it is time that "steps must be taken to engage in an era of paradigm search, in which competing concepts are carefully examined, seriously discussed and debated, and wherever possible combined", 24 the new Global Learning Division of the U.N. University has been formed, and is inviting "scholars representing established and emerging schools of thought, scientific paradigms, ideologies and cultural traditions to collaborate in critical studies." 25
Towards 'Critical Futurism'

There seem to me two or three related kinds of studies which should become more central to futures studies, if they are to become truly self-critical, and enable futurists to become more conscious of their culture-bound worldviews.

These areas of investigation centre round current research in 'the sociology of scientific knowledge' and the micro-sociology and ethnography of contemporary science, studies in the actual construction, socially, of scientific knowledge today. They help to flesh out the comparatively vague concepts of 'paradigm' and 'paradigm shift', which Kuhn's historical studies popularised, with specific case histories of how scientists, alone and in groups, react to and help create changes in the theoretical structure of the disciplines. The notion of 'sociological relativism' has become more prominent, and its relevance to the 'science, technology and society' debate makes it also relevant for futures studies. A related aspect of research involves a clearer understanding of the notion of 'ideology', not in the 'pure propaganda' sense which seems to be the usual American usage, but the second sense, derived from 'critical theory', of "a social analysis that not only misrepresents its object of analysis by focusing on its surface rather than its underlying structure and by denying its real history, but also misrepresents it in such a way as to favour the interests of the dominant class." 26 Or as Parekh put it in a recent book on ideology, "Distortion is ideological when it reveals a systematic social bias." 27 These meanings of 'ideology' are different in emphasis from our more generalised use of 'worldview' or 'interpretative framework' in that they focus particularly on the role of the power structure, the 'social bias' in the shaping of our values and behaviour.

There is a small but growing body of analysts in Britain and the U.S.A. who are particularly concerned with what is known as the 'labour process perspective'. This approach attempts to understand science and technology in terms of how the whole society is constituted, and "how science arises from and deeply influences its cultural setting". 28 Some of the issues they have addressed include the role of commercial pressures in the development of biotechnology, the drug industries, information and media technologies, and the costs of industrial diseases. Medicine is seen as a key part of the social and economic structure, and "illness as social relations of production and illness as hazard both emerge as inseparable aspects of the same labour process." 29
The role of the Professional-Managerial class, and aspects of racial and sexual repression form other parts of this promising social approach to science, technology and society, which shares, to my mind, many of the concerns of Hazel Henderson.\textsuperscript{30}

This kind of understanding helps us reveal the unexamined, 'natural' values embodied in our cultural heritage and institutions, so that we can generate a more informed discussion about how far to modify, maintain or radically change the present structure of our national and international institutions.

Despite the role of 'power' in politics, there seemed to be few papers and participants showing much awareness of power structures, and the ideological role of 'technological rationality'. Those who have read Ian Miles' excellent chapter on 'The Ideologies of Futurists' would not be too surprised, as he suggested that one reason for the over-emphasis on social statistics in postwar mainstream social science, "was the unwillingness of the practitioners to confront questions of the structure of power in modern societies", associated with "an elitist reliance upon scientists as the most appropriate diagnosticians of social problems."\textsuperscript{31} This led to uncritical uses of statistical data and analyses in futures research and futuristic social science. The apparently neutral and rational expert often upholds, he went on, "a process of control which is 'technocratic' in the sense of using science and technique simultaneously to maintain and legitimise the dominant position of existing power groups."\textsuperscript{32}

While this critical approach to science, technology and society studies is more familiar in Europe, and has recently been applied to the whole area of curriculum renewal by Richard Slaughter\textsuperscript{33}, one of the best critical sociologists is the American Alvin Gouldner. In his important book, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, he shows how the 'bureaucracy' developed into today's 'technocracy', in which the scientists became a kind of 'secular ministry', unselfishly working for the benefit of the people. But this has the effect of discouraging a real debate about alternative futures, or, in Gouldner's words, "The technocratic project turns men away from a fascination with the future.... It tells us that the future is already here, in essentials if not in its full maturity."\textsuperscript{34} Gouldner's analysis of the difficult way in which dominant power groups maintain their power while giving the illusion of not dominating is too intricate to do more than just refer to here. But his whole approach and analysis exemplify Miles' conclusion that futures studies need to be more sensitive to the role of 'ideology' and 'power structures' at a time when, "far from being the end of ideology, technology launches ideology upon a new stage in its career."\textsuperscript{35}
During my own research in the last few years I have become more aware of the differences between the dominant American and European traditions in the social sciences, exemplified to some extent in futures studies. To simplify rather crudely, American work in communications research and in the sociology of science tends to be largely "structural-functional" in the traditional, quasi-scientific belief that unless a behaviour or process can be quantified, measured and used to predict, then it is not worth consideration.

James Carey, an American researcher in the communications field, has compared the two traditions, and recommended that the European 'Cultural Studies' tradition was an "important corrective" for the biases of American scholarship. For where the American model of communication has been largely in terms of a context of persuasion, manipulation and attitude control, communication in European Studies is viewed "as a process through which shared culture is created, modified and transformed." 36

American sociologists (e.g. Daniel Bell) thought they could see 'an end of ideology' because they felt they were within reach of a truly scientific theory of politics, - "a victory of technological scientific, and rational-pragmatic modes of consciousness." 37 This myth of progress was short-lived, if not still-born, yet still, I suspect, believed throughout the world as part of the influential American cultural ethos. In Europe, however, concern was focused on problems of 'meaning' and 'interpretation' by human beings in the context of socially constructed versions of reality, and not just one reality, but multiple realities. Karl Mannheim had been influential in developing the 'sociology of knowledge' from the earlier, Marxian concepts of 'ideology', and made a strong case about the importance of socio-historical factors affecting how knowledge is both acquired and used. 38 He tended to exclude the 'exact sciences' from the kind of socio-historical 'relationism' which he applied to the rest of human knowledge. But recent studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge, particularly those originating in British universities, have confirmed the same kind of social construction processes at work in the laboratory, in the natural sciences. 39 Similar work has also been done in the 'marginal' or 'fringe' sciences (relevant for 'New Age' therapies, and psychical research.) 40

Some good reasons have been suggested for the different approach in Britain to the sociology of science in an essay by Joseph Ben-David. In Britain, he asserts, sociology is primarily undergraduate sociology, "training people to think and write about social issues in a clear, coherent and effective fashion," 41 whereas in the States the aim is more to turn out research
workers in specialised fields. Many of the 'interdisciplinary teams' in Britain working on the sociology of science are specialists from areas other than sociology, who have been drawn into the area by public discussion of the science and society issues, (e.g. scientists, philosophers). This contrasts with the specialised sociologists in the U.S. who have mainly followed the Mertonian tradition with its focus on the institutional and consensual aspects of science. Merton's essay, 'Paradigm for the Sociology of Knowledge'(1945) is cited by Ben-David and others as providing a sufficient outline of the difficulties involved in investigating this area that the majority of American sociologists are discouraged, with the exception of Alvin Gouldner and some of the younger generation, who believe that the social sciences have failed in their misguided attempt to model themselves too closely on the methods of 'natural science'. In England, where Merton's essay is little known, the implications of 'sociological relativism' in the sciences has become increasingly important. Ben-David's view is that British interdisciplinary teams were more interested in areas of scientific conflict than in those of consensus, and found Kuhn's work more relevant than Merton's. The two traditions, he feels, are "parallel or even complementary" not mutually exclusive. 

Though difficult to separate entirely, a distinction should be made between sociological relativism and philosophical relativism, in that the former is a strategy for doing the social history and sociology of science, separating the truth of a theory from the issue of explanation as to how it came into being or how belief in it is sustained. Whereas philosophical relativism is concerned with the issue of whether the truth values of a theory depend on the society in which it is found.

While I believe these 'critical' approaches are relevant to developing the sensitivity of futurists and futures studies, I thoroughly support the emphasis put by Eleonora Masini, in a recent Bulletin article on "Reconceptualising Futures", on the importance of 'vision' and 'project-building', on the practical attempts to live out one's ideals, not just talk about them. But the responsibility is a heavy one, for "The futurist, more than any other scientist", she wrote, "needs to acknowledge the existence and the value of cultures, attitudes and objectives that are different from his own." 

The 1982 W.F.S.F. conference in Stockholm certainly helped me to develop my own ideas in the stimulating company of so many outstanding people, including Eleonora Masini, from such distant parts of the world. And it also seemed that a considerable number of Swedish institutions and individuals were involved in a beneficial exchange of views on the highly relevant subject of 'The Future of Politics'. 
TABLE II

ii) **Presenters** of papers listed at the conference,
   a) Plenary lecturers
   b) Total papers listed, including plenaries (69)

**a) Plenary lecturers**

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<tr>
<td>Other 'advanced'</td>
<td>-</td>
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* T. Hägerstrand was ill and his paper was not available, so is not included in the total.


### iii) Women presenters at Stockholm

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10 (15% of 69)


### Women participants at Stockholm

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44 (22% of 199)
### TABLE II
Participants/contributors to the Stockholm W.F.S.F. Conference, 1962

i) Participants by current country; and by country of origin (o-o) so far as known

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>In groups</th>
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### TABLE III

1. **Presenters of papers at Kyoto, Japan (1970)**  
The total of 246 includes absentees(*)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>61 (2*)</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 'advanced' (Israel, Australia)</td>
<td>5 (1*)</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian 'satellites'</td>
<td>8 (3*)</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.D.C.s</td>
<td>11 (2*)</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.America</td>
<td>44 (5*)</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>246 (13*)</td>
<td>99.95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Presenters of papers at Frascati, Rome, Italy (1973)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian 'satellites'</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.D.C.s</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.America</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Women presenters at Rome, 1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.8% of 123 total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.D.C.s (Venezuela)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.America</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.9% of total papers(123)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

7. The World Futures Studies Federation, P.O. Box 6710-5-11385, Stockholm, Sweden. (Telephone: Sweden (08) 151580). A twelve page, blue-covered, leaflet summarises the history, objectives and current activities of the W.F.S.F. The annual membership/Newsletter charge is £30 per year.
Eleonora Masini is currently President of the W.F.S.F., c/o Casella Postale, 6203, I-Roma Prati, Italy:
* Some of the papers in this volume appear only in brief summary form as they were published in full, with some re-writing, in Human Futures: Needs, Societies, Technologies, U.K., IRADES / IPC Business Press, 1974, 181 pp. (Contributors were: Sam Cole, Jim Dator, Yehezkel Dror, Maurice Guernier, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Harold Linstead, John McHale, Lewis Mumford, William Simon, and Craig Sinclair.)
13. **Common Interest** is a series of half-hour documentary T.V. programmes which do attempt to provide such a Third World viewpoint. The series is shown on the new U.K. 'Channel Four', an Independent Broadcasting Authority channel, and produced by Independent Broadcasting Trust Productions Ltd., supported by sixty-three charity organisations concerned with development issues. Address: I.B.T., 9, Upper Berkeley St., London W1H 3BY, U.K.


15. See Note 9 for details of the Rome conference publications, in five volumes. The Kyoto conference proceedings were published in four volumes by Kodansha Ltd., 2-12-21, Otowa, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112, Japan, in 1970.


17. E.P. Thompson, "We must strike directly at the structures of the cold war itself...", *Guardian*, Feb. 21st 1983, p. 9. (This stresses the importance of linking the human rights issues with disarmament, but not as a condition.)


20. D. Balson (Ed.) *Computer based conferencing systems for Developing Countries*, I.D.R.C., Box 8500, Ottawa, Canada K1G 3H9.


23. ibid. p. 19.

24. ibid. p. 25.


28. A series of books are being published jointly in the U.K (CSE Books) and in the U.S.A. (Humanities Press Inc. N.J.) on the 'labour process perspective'.

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28 cont'd

e.g. Les Levidow, Bob Young (Eds.) Science, Technology and the Labour Process, 1981, including chapters by the Americans, Nathan Rosenberg and Norman Diamond. Bob Young, a N American émigré, spent some years as a don at Cambridge University, and has been one of the main figures in the development of 'radical science' and the 'labour process perspective' in the U.K.


Bob Young is currently the consultant for a series of one hour television programmes on science and society, titled Crucible, monthly, on U.K.'s Channel Four. (Central T.V., 46, Charlotte Street, London W.1, U.K.)


32. ibid. p. 380


35. ibid. p. 270.


37. Gouldner op. cit. p. 170


40. Harry Collins, Trevor Pinch, Frames of Meaning: The Social Construction of


43. op.cit. 41, p. 209.


I. Of Power, 20 pages
- Mihailo Marković: Decentralization: A Precondition for a More Rational Society, 34 pages
- Radmila Nakarada: Politics as a Way of Life, 6 pages
- Jerry Richardson: Overcrowded Policy Making, 15 pages

II. Leadership and Participation
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- Henryk Skolimowski: The Reality, and Illusions of Power, 26 pages
- Svetozar Stojanović: Reflections on the Crisis of the Marxist View of Power, 17 pages

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- Andrew Jamison: On the Politics of Environmentalism in Scandinavia, 24 pages
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7. Peter Steensgaard
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8. David Westerlund
   Presentation of an ongoing research project at the Dept. of Comparative Religion, University of Stockholm, 2 pages

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7. Thomas Lundén
   Ethnicity, Territory and the State in the Post(?)-

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   Negros y Judíos en el Uruguay (in Spanish only), 22 pages

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12. Håkan Wiberg
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6. Ulrich Widmaier
   Indicators of Government Performance and Mass Political Support: The Globus Simulation Model, 38 pages

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Following the successful Youth Forum at VII World Conference, Stockholm, the following issues might be discussed:

1. The role of children and youth in the Federation.

2. The role of youth organizations in the Federation, that is, whether youth institutions are eligible for institutional membership.